

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



12 February 2025

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

RAIB Report: Derailment of a freight train near Langworth, Lincolnshire on 30 June 2015

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 4 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 27 June 2016.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 4 is **'Closed'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 4

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that there is a robust process in place at Lincoln depot for reprioritising work orders relating to hot weather preparation so that the mitigation of any associated risks is appropriately managed.

Network Rail should examine the process of managerial oversight of the reprioritisation and cancellation of work orders at its Lincoln depot assure itself that these are being undertaken in accordance with company procedures, that the decision-making processes are technically sound and risk based and, where necessary, any interim mitigation measures are put in place (paragraph 101b). This recommendation may have wider application within Network Rail's maintenance functions.

ORR decision

1. Network Rail have provided evidence that there was no under-resourcing at Lincoln Depot (the work backlog in 2018, was 0.2% of the total work bank, which is very low). The Network Rail RAM team (now Infrastructure Engineering) undertook independent on-site management assurance of the Lincoln depot work bank and Ellipse asset records. It found that although generally Ellipse records accurately reflected asset condition and reprioritisations were correctly processed, the wrong priorities had been assigned to various faults due to a misunderstanding of track categories. The relevant staff were briefed on assigning track categories by the RAM team and the codes corrected in Ellipse. Network Rail consider this work to constitute the additional managerial oversight required by the recommendation.

2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

3. On 6 October 2017 ORR reported that we considered Network Rail's initial response to recommendation 3 to be insufficient, as it set out a review of work done on the ground, rather than addressing management oversight, which we consider to be the key theme of the recommendation.

Network Rail provided a more detailed work plan to address recommendation 4 on 7 March 2017, which was due to be completed by the end of March 2017. We asked Network Rail to confirm completion.

Update

4. On 22 January 2019 Network Rail provided the following closure statement:



Closure Statement -
Langworth.docx

5. Network Rail state in summary the following:

This statement applies to both Recommendations (3 & 4). An independent review of the Ellipse workbank has been conducted for Lincoln DU. This has found that Ellipse records are consistent with the asset condition and that reprioritisation is being carried out in accordance with the Ellipse Handbook. The review found instances where priority codes in ellipse were incorrect due to the wrong track category being applied. This has now been corrected. It should be noted that Lincoln DU has a very low level of ellipse backlog for Track and at 21/12/18 is at 0.2% of workbank. Therefore, as backlog is low and prioritisation and reprioritisation is being undertaken correctly, this indicates that the resource levels are adequate.

6. On 8 May 2021 Network Rail provided the following update:

From my recollection, in order to provide the closure statement, the RAM team undertook some on site assurance on the Lincoln workbank and found some incorrect priority codes. The relevant staff were briefed by the RAM team (now Infrastructure Engineer) and the codes corrected in Ellipse.

Therefore, I believe this falls into the category of additional managerial oversight, but it's also a normal requirement / duty and expectation of the Route Infrastructure Engineer Team to undertake such activity.

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 4

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Network Rail should examine the process of managerial oversight of the reprioritisation and cancellation of work orders at its Lincoln depot assure itself that these are being undertaken in accordance with company procedures, that the decision-making processes are technically sound and risk based and, where necessary, any interim mitigation measures are put in place (paragraph 101b). This recommendation may have wider application within Network Rail's maintenance functions.

ORR decision

1. ORR notified Network Rail that we considered their initial response to be insufficient, as it set out a review of work done on the ground, rather than addressing management oversight, which we consider to be the key theme of the recommendation.

2. We made clear to Network Rail we would expect the response to include an independent review of the management systems and a review of the evidence on Network Rail's systems that support (or not) the decisions to reprioritise work in accordance with their own procedures. The recommendation refers to reprioritisation and cancellation in the widest sense, not just the management of hot weather precautions.

3. Network Rail provided a more detailed work plan to address update response to recommendations 3 and 4 on 7 March 2017, which were due to be completed by the end of March 2017. We have asked Network Rail to confirm completion. If addressed as described, the action taken would satisfactorily address both recommendation 3 and 4.

4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- but has not yet confirmed completion of the actions associated with the recommendation

Status: Progressing. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Information in support of ORR decision

5. See paras 4 and 5 for Network Rail response to both recommendations.