Rail Value for Money Study: British Transport Police Review
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Rail Value for Money Study: British Transport Police Review

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1 Key Messages
1 Key Messages

1.1.1 AECOM has been commissioned to undertake a brief strategic review to look at the Value for Money of the British Transport Police (BTP). This review forms part of the wider Rail Value for Money Study led by Sir Roy McNulty.

1.1.2 This brief strategic review has been tasked with reviewing the costs of the BTP and identifying strategic opportunities to reduce those costs. The review provides commentary on:

- The cost of the British Transport Police incorporating those changes to the cost base that will be obtained from committed or anticipated general efficiency plans;
- The opportunity for strategic change in the nature and purpose of the BTP;
- The complexity of implementation – one-off and ongoing costs; residual costs, potential legislative requirements and barriers to implementation; and
- The risk of implementation – the attitude of industry parties to reductions in the costs of the BTP caused by strategic change.

1.1.3 AECOM has discussed the key issues above with a cross section of rail industry representatives, a number of whom are also members of the BTPA, but not all.

1.1.4 Discussions were also held with the Chief Constable of BTP and members of his senior team.

1.1.5 Views provided in these discussions have not been attributed to individuals.

1.1.6 The majority view appears to favour maintaining the BTP in its current form and protecting the core services that BTP provides to the rail industry.

1.1.7 There are views at either end of the spectrum which have been expressed to the study team. These range from expanding the role and responsibilities of BTP, including consideration of BTP taking on the VOSA and Traffic Officer services on the Strategic Highway network, to wholesale transfer of BTP functions to some or all of the 43 Home Office police forces.

1.1.8 All of the discussions reflected on the core requirements of the VfM review and a keen awareness was demonstrated across the stakeholders and BTP that funding cuts on a scale not previously considered may well become reality.

1.1.9 BTP and the majority of stakeholders felt that there was no “silver bullet” that would reduce the cost of providing the current standards of police cover, safety and security for rail passengers and staff and the current levels of performance in terms of crime prevention and detection.

1.1.10 The majority felt that more could be achieved for incrementally less cost through a programme of efficiency measures. BTP and a number of stakeholders felt that the emphasis should be to protect front line services and focus cost savings on HQ and support functions.

1.1.11 A range of potential strategic cost saving measures has been identified and is described at Chapter 3.
British Transport Police
2 British Transport Police

2.1.1 The British Transport Police (BTP) is the national police force for the railways, providing a policing service to Network Rail, rail and rail freight operating companies, their staff and their passengers throughout England, Wales and Scotland. BTP is also responsible for policing the London Underground System, the Docklands Light Railway, High Speed 1 (formerly Channel Tunnel Rail Link), the Midland Metro Tram System and Croydon Tramlink. BTP’s vision is:

“to provide policing excellence for Britain’s railways. This means being professional in all that we do, and continually striving to provide the best possible service to our railway community and the travelling public”.

2.1.2 BTP’s mission is to work in partnership with others to help build a safe railway environment that is free from disruption and the fear of crime. BTP seek to achieve this by:

- being dedicated to the specialist needs of the railway community;
- improving systems and structures to increase effectiveness at all levels;
- improving flows of information to the community about BTP aims and achievements;
- ensuring staff are well trained and supported to enable BTP to deliver the highest possible quality of service; and
- providing value for money in all they do.

2.1.3 BTP operations are divided into seven territorial areas; these are Scotland, North Eastern, North Western, Wales and Western, London North, London South and L Division covering London Underground and DLR.

2.1.4 Before privatisation, BTP was funded by the British Railways Board. At privatisation, providers and users of the rail network became responsible for funding BTP and responsibility for the BTP fell to the British Railways Board (Residuary). From 2001, control of the BTP fell to the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), a non-departmental public body (NDPB), overseen by a Police Committee with a statutory responsibility to maintain an “adequate and efficient” police service for the railways. Following the assent of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA), another NDPB, was established in July 2004.

2.1.5 Since 2004, the BTPA has been the independent body responsible for ensuring an efficient and effective British Transport Police force for rail operators, their staff and passengers. It is modelled as much as possible on the set up of a local police authority, but it oversees a force that is responsible for a national transport network rather than a geographic or territorial area.

2.1.6 British Transport Police is funded by Train Operating Companies (TOCs), Rail Freight Operating Companies (FOCs) and Network Rail. It is the BTPA that enters a Police Service Agreement with each of these companies, indicating the level of policing resource that will be allocated to its lines and services. BTPA maintains similar arrangements with Network Rail and London Underground. PSA holders are free to negotiate additional resources with BTPA and BTP. This has been the case with Transport for London (TfL) for London Underground and for the London Overground concession on the National Rail network, and High Speed 1 (HS1).

2.2 Reviews of BTP

2.2.1 In the last ten years, and previously to that, the BTP has been the subject of a number of reviews undertaken by and on behalf of a number of different bodies. Key reviews considered as part of this review are the Inspection Reports by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) in 2001/2002 and 2003/2004 and the House of Commons Transport Select Committee Special Reports in 2003-04 and 2005-06. AECOM has also been provided with a copy of the Department for Transport’s (DfT) Transport Management and Policing Integration Report finalised in 2010.
2.2.2 This brief strategic review has been tasked with reviewing the costs of the BTP and identifying strategic opportunities to reduce those costs.

2.3 Costs of BTP

2.3.1 Between 2004 and 2009, BTP experienced budget increases which combined, totalled 57% during the period. Reasons for this rapid expansion of the BTP budget are explored later in this section. However since 2009, the force has seen a small budgetary increase in 2010/11 (1.3%) and a budgetary reduction in real terms for 2011/12 (-3.3%).

2.3.2 The total BTP budget requirement for 2011/12 reported to BTPA in December 2010 has been set at £200,122,000, with £196,969,000 for policing services and £1,870,000 for the BTPA (in cash terms). The aim for 2012/13 is for BTP to have a 0% budget increase in cash terms, while recognising the unquantified budgetary risk presented by the 2012 Olympics. L Division budget requirements sit outside these figures and for 2011/12 at the time of writing were unavailable.

2.3.3 Both TfL and HS1 have, since the start of the economic downturn, requested amendments to their Enhanced PSAs (EPSA). BTPA received communication from ATOC regarding BTP’s 2010/11 budget which urged at least a standstill budget.

Figure 1 – BTP Number of Employees

Figure 1 shows that the level of BTP employment has continued to rise at a steady rate of about 5% since 1998/99. The main exception is a large increase in Police Staff in 2004/05. This 44% increase occurred as 5 January 2005 was the first time that BTP and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) were on duty at the same time.

1. Figures here are from published accounts.
2.3.5 Since 2005/06 there has been very little change in the number of Police Officers, with an average increase of employees at around 1%. Police Staff have continued to increase at a rate of around 10% per year. This has been driven by a number of factors, including response to criticisms in the 2003/04 HMIC review and various DfT reviews. At the time of the 2003/4 HMIC Review, BTP had no consistent or rigorous performance review in place for its staff. The HMIC report pre-dated the BTPA. There was a distinct lack of adequate support systems and infrastructure in a number of areas, notably HR, finance and technology. The BTPA implemented a significant investment programme to address deficiencies in systems, processes and equipment which brought the BTP much closer to the service offer and standards of Home Office Police Forces, in some cases exceeding those standards. Standardisation of management information and automation of data systems across all seven BTP Areas was implemented. This period also coincided with significant development of Counter Terrorism policing and greater sharing of intelligence with Home Office forces.

Figure 2 – BTP Staff Costs

2.3.6 Total Staff Cost and Cost per Employee follow a very similar trend. Figure 2 shows that gradually over time both Total Staff Cost and Cost per Employee have increased. Both increase particularly between 2004/05 and 2008/09, during implementation of the BTPA investment programme. This coincides with similar trends in other parts of the rail industry and the wider economy during this period.

Source: BTP Statistical Bulletin

2 The figures quoted in our main report were based on data received from the DfT. Figures here are from published accounts, and therefore not necessarily exactly the same.
2.3.7 Unsurprisingly, as employment rapidly increased (see Figure 1) in 2004/05 so did staff cost, which increased from £93,689,000 (£2008/09) in 2003/04 to £116,557,000 (£2008/09) in 2004/05, an increase of 24%. There was an even greater increase of 31% from 2004/05 to 2005/06. Cost per employee followed a similar trend, however not to such a large degree. Staff cost in 2009/10 fell slightly from the previous year to £211,915,000. Table 1 shows these figures in more detail.

Table 1: BTP Outturn Staff Costs 2001 – 2010 (in 2008/09 Prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Police Officers*</th>
<th>Police Staff (inc. PCSOs)*</th>
<th>Total Staff*</th>
<th>Police Officers (no LU)</th>
<th>Police Staff (no LU)</th>
<th>Total Staff Costs (£m)*</th>
<th>Avg Staff Cost (£)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>2,767</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>99,600</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>2,873</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>106,100</td>
<td>46,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>2,984</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>48,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>134,100</td>
<td>50,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>2,774</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>3,978</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>170,700</td>
<td>55,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>4,191</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>192,700</td>
<td>58,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>2,835</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>4,290</td>
<td>2,133</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>198,500</td>
<td>63,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>4,546</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>213,919</td>
<td>47,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>4,552</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>211,915</td>
<td>46,554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes L Division Staff and Costs

2.4 Crime and its Costs

2.4.1 Notifiable Crimes include all offences that could possibly be tried by jury (these include some less serious offences) plus a few additional closely related offences, such as assault without injury. A detected crime is one that has been ‘cleared up’ by the police. For any crime to be counted as detected, sufficient evidence must be available to claim a detection and both of the following conditions must be met:–

- a notifiable offence has been committed and recorded
- a suspect has been identified and has been made aware that they will be recorded as being responsible for committing that crime and what the full implication of this are

2.4.2 Figure 3 shows that with an increasing workforce, the BTP has managed to decrease Notifiable Crimes significantly in the last four years with a decrease of 27%. Detected crimes have gradually increased at a rate of around 7% since 2001/02 with highs of around 18% between 2005/06 and 2006/07. Operational improvements have brought detection rates to a level closer to Home Office forces. For the indicators where a reasonable comparison can be made with Home Office forces, BTP has moved from the lower quartile 8 years ago to the upper quartile.

2.4.3 For example, Network Rail has investigated alternative ways of dealing with cable theft but has found that the only effective means of deterring scrap metal dealers from handling stolen cable is for uniformed officers and detectives to deal with them. BTP has developed specific knowledge and expertise in partnership with Network Rail to do this.
2.4.4 Analysis undertaken on British Transport Police (BTP) recorded crimes data 2006/07\(^3\) identifies that crime against the public transport operator (rail, London Underground and light rail operators) accounts for at least 69% of the costs arising as a consequence and in response to crime. In contrast, those offences where a person is the victim of crime (passenger or staff) account for 31% of total cost with 13% accounted for by violence against the person, 9% for sexual offences, 8% for theft or robbery and 1% for vehicle related crimes. Total costs\(^4\) estimated as consequence and in response to BTP recorded crime in 2006/07 were £926.9 million.

*Figure 3 – BTP Notifiable Crimes*

2.4.5 However, it is very difficult to monetise the value added by BTP. Much of the “evidence” is intuitive or anecdotal. Absence of crime and the worth of the police force are extremely difficult to value in monetary terms.


\(^4\) The total costs of such offences to society as a whole and not only the costs that are incurred by the rail and bus industry.
2.5 Changes Implemented to Date

2.5.1 BTP has an established programme for incremental cost reductions covering a range of issues and operational areas. For example, BTP is addressing overheads initially by altering supervisory ratios. However, there are areas where the ability to make big savings is limited, e.g. remoter parts of the network such as Inverness, Devon and Cornwall and the Cambrian Coast.

2.5.2 Standardisation of management information and automation of data systems across all seven BTP Areas was implemented under the BTPA investment programme. This has brought BTP in line with the Policing services offered by Home Office Forces and has delivered significant improvements in achieving Policing Plan\(^5\) targets, placing BTP in a strong position relative to the 43 Home Office Forces, improving its effectiveness and increasing its credibility throughout the Rail Industry and the Policing community.

2.5.3 Recently, BTP’s HR Transformation Project has reduced costs by 22%, made up of headcount reductions and other cost savings. HR centralisation has resulted in efficiencies and cost reductions at Area level.

2.5.4 The current BTP proposals for further incremental cost reductions are intended to protect core services: BTP is seeking to provide the same levels and standards of service for less cost. In the event of significant funding reductions, BTP would look at its HQ functions, its property portfolio and its command structure.

\(^5\) BTP Policing Plans are published annually and set out how BTP will deliver their strategic aims at national and Area level.
3 Opportunities for Cost Reduction through Strategic Change
3 Opportunities for Cost Reduction through Strategic Change

3.1.1 A number of options have been identified that could contribute to cost reductions arising from strategic change in BTP activities. In the main, these options have been identified previously and are not completely new ideas. In discussions with Rail Industry stakeholders, BTP senior officers, BTPA members and the Rail VfM team, we have sought as broad a range of perspectives as possible on potential areas for cost reductions. In debating potential options, we have sought to gain an appreciation of the advantages, the disadvantages and likely reaction from key stakeholders to each option.

3.1.2 In addition to pure cost reduction measures, we also consider opportunities where adding critical mass to the BTP may defray overheads and therefore provide overall benefits, in the event that additional responsibilities are transferred to BTP from other agencies.

3.1.3 Table 2 overleaf summarises the main options. The percentages assumed to be saved and their potential monetary value are high level assumptions taking into account known costs and proportion of overall staff numbers which could potentially be reduced. We have assumed that 74% of total BTP costs are associated with staffing costs. These options fall broadly into the following five categories:

- Transfer of specific BTP Activities to other agencies
- Incremental Efficiency Measures
- Organisational and funding Changes
- Increasing the Scope of BTP Activities
- Transfer all BTP Activities to Home Office Forces

3.1.4 These are then covered in more detail, option by option. The savings identified in the table are not cumulative. There are likely to be overlaps between some options. These overlaps have not been quantified in this report.
### Table 2: Options for Cost Reduction

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<tr>
<th>Option 1.</th>
<th>Transfer of specific BTP Activities to other agencies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disbenefits</strong></td>
<td><strong>Industry Views</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Merge L Division with Metropolitan Police</td>
<td>Saves up to 25% of BTP activity, possibly £45m to £55m p.a.</td>
<td>Savings on resource, cost and overhead</td>
<td>Reduces critical mass of BTP May not realise full overhead saving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Remove BTP Special Branch</td>
<td>Transfers 5-8% (£9.8m - £15.8m) of BTP activity</td>
<td>Resource and cost saving</td>
<td>BTP effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Transfer all Serious Crime investigation to Home Office Forces</td>
<td>Incremental cost savings as BTP concentrates on Rail specific crime; 3%-6% (£5.9m – £11.8m saving)</td>
<td>Greater focus, narrower spread of activities and administrative costs</td>
<td>Lose breadth of offer and potentially ability for resources to move between BTP and Home Office forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Transfer football policing responsibility to Home Office forces</td>
<td>Could save 14% of BTP costs (£27.5m)</td>
<td>Savings on resource, cost and overhead; improved focus on rail specific requirements</td>
<td>Reduces critical mass of BTP May not realise full overhead saving</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option 2.</th>
<th>Incremental Efficiency Measures</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disbenefits</strong></td>
<td><strong>Industry Views</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Revise mix of PCs, PCSOs and Security staff</td>
<td>Potential reduction in front line costs 8%-12% (£11.7m - £17.5m)</td>
<td>Better tailored local policing and security solutions</td>
<td>Dilution of BTP effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Merge HQ functions</td>
<td>Reduce overheads, 5%-8% (£9.8m - £15.8m)</td>
<td>Multifunctional posts in HQ organisation resulting in more efficient resource deployment</td>
<td>Risk of spreading staff too thinly across core support functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Revise rostering process</td>
<td>Negotiate revisions to timescales for issuing and for revising rosters, potential cost and efficiency savings 12%-15% (£17.5m – £21.9m)</td>
<td>Better responsive policing, more efficient resource deployment, cost reduction.</td>
<td>Significant obstacles to renegotiating T&amp;Cs</td>
</tr>
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### Organisational and Funding Changes

<table>
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<th>Option 3.</th>
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<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Disbenefits</th>
<th>Industry Views</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>h) Reduce number of PSAs with Horizontal Alignment of Network Rail and TOCs</td>
<td>Reduces number of negotiations, achieves synergy benefits as each PSA would involve TOCs and NR; Potential 10-15% saving (£19.7m - £29.5m).</td>
<td>Efficiency savings and improved cross industry communication, more effective deployment of police resources</td>
<td>Dependent on NR restructuring and refranchising. Not possible before current PSAs expire</td>
<td>Likely to be of interest across the industry, although some TOCs may prefer their own PSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Amend BTP charging regime so that core activities are funded by a fixed PSA charge and Users have ability to agree variable elements</td>
<td>Potential headline cost savings for core services; User choice; Potential 12%-15% saving (£23.6m – £29.5m)</td>
<td>User engagement and ownership of decisions on local policing solutions; maintains user pays principle and adds value by enabling choice</td>
<td>May result in reduced policing in some areas</td>
<td>Has some support across the industry</td>
</tr>
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### Increasing the Scope of BTP Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option 4.</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Disbenefits</th>
<th>Industry Views</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>j) Add VOSA, TOS, Port and Airport functions to BTP</td>
<td>No figures are identified for BTP cost savings alone, but it is reasonable to assume a potential BTP overhead cost saving in the region of £15-£25million.</td>
<td>Strengthens BTP operational base, adding diversity. Potential improvements in Highway incident management and consequent saving in delay and congestion costs.</td>
<td>Adding non-core activities may stretch existing resources and impact on the core service offer; overhead savings may not be delivered as expected. Met and HO force resistance to reductions in their resource base.</td>
<td>Some support for adding functions to BTP if there are tangible savings in return.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Option 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transfer all BTP Activities to Home Office Forces</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Disbenefits</th>
<th>Industry Views</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>k) Complete transfer of BTP responsibilities to Home Office Forces</td>
<td>Saves entire cost of BTP, BTPA (2011/12 BTP/BTPA budget £198,839,271) and associated activities, but costs of transfer not quantified.</td>
<td>Additional costs imposed on Home Office Forces. Over time, loss of service to Rail Industry, increased threat of crime at stations and on trains, increased risk of terrorist attack, increased delays and disruption when incidents occur</td>
<td>Transferring BTP responsibilities to Home Office forces would result in degradation and ultimately loss of service as Home Office force priorities are very different.</td>
<td>Distinct differences between TOC requirements and the requirements of Home Office forces, in respect of policing public order, drugs and incident management. No call for a radical curtailment of current roles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Option 1: Transfer of BTP Activities
4 Option 1: Transfer of BTP Activities

4.1 Merge BTP London Area with Metropolitan Police force (a)

Potential annual cost saving in the region of £45million

4.1.1 This option was proposed in 2005 by the Metropolitan Police and discussed by the House of Commons Transport Select Committee.

4.1.2 There would be a significant cost saving to BTP in transferring the London Area to the control of the Metropolitan Police. London Area covers TfL modes i.e. London Underground, Docklands Light Railway and London Overground Rail Operations Limited. Transferring BTP London Area to the Metropolitan Police would ensure that the Mayor for London had responsibility for transport and its policing across the Greater London Authority area of responsibility.

4.1.3 However, Network Rail considers that operationally, BTP acts as the “glue” between modes in London when incidents occur, providing valuable crowd management and managing interfaces between TOCs, NR station staff and LU.

4.1.4 There is an argument that there may be a saving in overheads to BTP and that the increase in overhead for the Metropolitan Police would be less than the saving achieved by BTP. This remains to be calculated in any detail.

4.1.5 Stakeholders are concerned that the impact on BTP of reducing its resourcing by 25% would be to reduce it to a level where its effectiveness and ability to secure efficiencies would be reduced. The focus would be entirely on the National Rail network.

4.1.6 Arguments in favour of BTP retaining a Counter Terrorism capability would be reduced and possibly removed in the event of the Metropolitan Police controlling the current London Area. However, there would still be a requirement on BTP to police Network Rail Lines and Stations in much of London and therefore to liaise closely with a Metropolitan Police controlled London Area. The corollary of this is that any synergy and coordination benefits that currently exist between the London, London North and London South Areas may be severely reduced or disappear altogether.

4.1.7 The Metropolitan Police has not, at any point, identified a quantified assessment of the potential benefits of merging the BTP London Area with its own operations or the efficiency and cost savings that such a move would deliver.

4.1.8 Transport Select Committee, Future of the British Transport Police, Fifth Report of Session 2005–06 made the following statement regarding potential transfer of BTP responsibilities to the Metropolitan Police:

The facts speak for themselves: no case for changing the status quo, much less justifying the ‘take over’ of the British Transport Police by the Metropolitan Police Service, has been made in the areas examined so far.
4.2 Transfer Role of BTP Special Branch to Home Office Forces (b)

**Potential annual cost saving in the region of £9.8m - £15.8m**

4.2.1 The BTP Special Branch is a product of the investment in the force following a series of reviews and the establishment of the BTPA. It is viewed by senior BTP officers as an integral and essential element of the improved standard of service now being delivered by BTP. It enables the force to be compared favourably with the 43 Home Office Forces in its intelligence, investigative and detection capabilities. The results achieved by BTP in improving detection rates are held in part to be due to the force having built and maintained this capability. However, there is a view amongst some stakeholders that this capability has not been demonstrated to add significantly to the effectiveness of BTP; demonstrating a clear cause and effect relationship between BTP Special Branch and improved achievement of Policing Plan targets may be a challenge.

4.2.2 In light of this, some have argued that the Special Branch capability may be an area for potential cost savings.

4.2.3 Given the need for significant cost savings across the Rail Industry, some argue that a “one size fits all” approach to policing may not be appropriate for the industry in future, compared to Home Office policing.

4.2.4 The overall cost of BTP Special Branch is assumed to be in the region of £6 to 8 million per annum. If a proportion of total HQ support costs is applied, it would be reasonable to assume a potential cost saving in the regions of £7 to £9 million per annum could be achieved. However, there may be hidden costs associated with making the change, including the costs of changing BTP processes and requirements to ensure that areas of activity currently dependent on or linked to Special Branch activity were properly addressed through the transition to new methods of working.

4.3 Transfer all Serious Crime investigation to Home Office Forces (c)

**Potential cost saving £5.9m - £11.8m p.a.**

4.3.1 Incremental cost savings could be realised as BTP concentrates on Rail specific crime, passing to local police any serious crimes for which they are fully equipped. While this would remove capability and reduce the broad service offer provided by BTP, it would enable increased focus to be applied to Rail specific crimes, including cable theft, ticketless travel and disorder at night on trains and at stations.

4.3.2 The main disbenefit to BTP would be to reduce the attractiveness of BTP to those wishing to develop their police careers and may result in BTP finding it more difficult to attract the best staff through recruitment. It could be perceived as degrading the BTP from its position alongside Home Office forces.

4.3.3 Crimes committed at rail stations that are not railway specific are likely to be carried out by local offenders potentially known to local police forces. Requiring BTP to investigate such crimes may generate inefficiencies due to relative lack of familiarity with local offenders.
4.4 Transfer football policing responsibility to Home Office forces (d)

Potential cost saving £25 - 30m p.a.

4.4.1 BTP currently provides significant resources on train and at stations to manage travelling football supporters. The burden of cost for football policing placed directly upon the Rail industry has been estimated at around 14% of overall BTP policing activity, potentially in the region of over £30 million per annum. Much of BTP activity in this area is not visible. The need for officers to travel with football supporters and responding to unplanned meeting of different sets of supporters adds a burden of resource and cost.

4.4.2 There are approximately 900,000 minutes\(^6\) of delay caused each year by anti-social acts on the rail network. These anti-social crimes, of which football hooliganism is a key example, move with the train, all affect services and are pushed from one policing area to another. Problems of this nature are communicated through the rail network to central controls and are normally dealt with by BTP. The proportion of delay minutes directly attributable to football supporters is not quantified.

4.4.3 Arguments in favour of BTP continuing to provide this service include the fact that BTP is a national police force with specialist knowledge of the rail network and the impacts of incidents on the operation of that network.

4.4.4 If this responsibility were to be transferred to Home Office police forces, a large number of interfaces would need to be managed.

4.4.5 The consequences of transferring this role away from BTP are not certain. Home Office forces may consider football policing away from stadia to be relatively low priority for preventive policing and choose merely to react and respond to any incidents that may arise.

4.4.6 It is possible that there may be a loss of intelligence gathered by BTP over a number of years that would enable groups of travelling hooligans to see the rail network as a convenient location for arranged meets, resulting in disruption and potentially deterring law abiding passengers from travelling. This in turn would potentially impact upon train operators’ revenue.

4.4.7 There is concern amongst BTPA Members that the fragmentation of British Transport Police or its absorption into Home Office Forces would be detrimental to the safety and security of rail passengers and staff. However there is also a view that football policing should not be a responsibility of BTP at the expense of the Rail Industry.

\(^6\) National Railway Crime Group (NRCG)
Option 2: Incremental Efficiency Measures
5 Option 2: Incremental Efficiency Measures

5.1.1 As stated in Chapter 2, BTP has established a programme of incremental efficiency savings that is already in place. Recent BTP annual budgets are shown below in Table 3.

Table 3: Recent BTP Annual Budgets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BTP Budget (£)</th>
<th>BTPA Budget (£)</th>
<th>Total Budget (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>202,176,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>202,176,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>196,969,000</td>
<td>1,870,000</td>
<td>198,839,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not including BTPA budget for 2010/11

5.1.2 The BTP budget for 2012/13 is planned to be a standstill budget in cash terms recognising an unquantifiable risk associated with the London Olympics.

5.2 Revise mix of PCs, PCSOs and Security staff (e)

Potential Cost Saving £11.7m - £17.5m

5.2.1 In recent years, in particular in London but also elsewhere on the network for example in Merseyside, initiatives have been developed that recognise the need for alternative levels of policing, security presence and reassurance. BTP can deploy a Police Community Support Officer for around half of the cost of a fully warranted Police Constable. In addition, TOCs may choose to deploy private security officers with the ability to issue fixed penalties for ticketless travel and other minor offences. On London Underground and LOROL and also on Merseyrail, this approach has resulted in more visible resources and a responsive approach to dealing with a range of Railway and Passenger needs, beyond the need to have an arresting officer patrolling a local area. BTP report that accrediting rail staff with fixed penalty powers has helped reduce the administrative burden on BTP as well as improving passenger perceptions of security.

5.2.2 There is likely to be scope on parts of the network and at particular stations for PSA holders to work more closely with BTP in defining the most appropriate level of resource. Potential reduction in front line costs could be achieved through this approach.

5.2.3 As stated above, a number of TOCs, provide their own supplementary security staff who protect passengers and staff, but at a cost to the TOC and with no mechanism for a commensurate reduction in BTP costs. There is a view is that TOCs are capable of handling security at stations and on trains through deployment of security staff, without the need for fully trained and warranted police officers.

5.2.4 Disbenefits of revising the mix of police officer and police staff capability however could include dilution of BTP effectiveness. In this vein, PCSOs may not be the best solution for TOCs. There is a perceived risk of PSCOs being reallocated from police work to community work.
5.3 Merge HQ functions (f)

**Potential cost savings £9.8m - £15.8m**

5.3.1 It is likely that some efficiency savings could be achieved by identifying opportunities to merge activities within the HQ organisation. Multifunctional posts in the HQ organisation would result in more efficient resource deployment and enable staff to develop a broader range of skills, enhancing career prospects. Key areas for consideration should focus on posts with responsibility for data handling and processing. This could apply to staff with responsibilities for financial analysis and staff responsible for performance monitoring.

5.3.2 Focusing on core requirements and removing peripheral or discretionary activity from support staff can be effective in reducing costs. However, it is also important to recognise where a multifunctional approach can help and where such an approach can deliver synergy benefits. This is possibly more the case in the Areas outside London where achieving critical mass within remaining overheads is more of a challenge.

5.3.3 There may be a possibility of reducing overhead costs by a transfer of roles from BTP to Home Office forces.

5.4 Revise Rostering Process (g)

**Potential Cost Saving £17.5m - £21.9m**

5.4.1 Rostering constraints apply to PCSOs as well as to PCs. The 3 month notice for rosters with 28 day notice for changes and time and a half to be paid for late notice changes all place constraints on BTP. Ability to respond to emerging needs and to revise resource deployment plans are impaired and can be inefficient and costly due to the IR implications.

5.4.2 Shift patterns do not coincide with need: resource allocation and management could be improved.

5.4.3 While not insurmountable, the obstacles to implementation would need to be assessed and the costs of overcoming them would need to be established before the benefits of implementation could be fully realised.
6 Option 3: Organisational and Funding Initiatives
6 Option 3: Organisational and Funding Initiatives

6.1.1 BTPA consider that the funding mechanism for BTP is as good as it can be as long as the “user pays” principle applies. While being seen to be reasonably fair, BTPA Members consider that it would benefit from further development.

6.2 Reduce number of PSAs with Horizontal Alignment of Network Rail and TOCs (h)

Potential Cost Saving £19.7m - £29.5m

6.2.1 A reduction in the number of PSAs would reduce the number of negotiations and achieve synergy benefits as each PSA would involve TOCs and NR working together, following realignment of TOC and NR geography. Clearly, the benefits to be achieved through this approach depend very much on the delivery of VfM Review proposals in respect of NR and franchise realignment.

6.2.2 Efficiency savings and improved cross industry communication would result from revising the number of PSAs in response to implementation of horizontal alignment.

6.2.3 Better coordination of NR and TOC requirements would result in a more effective joint approach to partnership in setting relevant targets within each PSA, enable improved responsiveness to NR and TOC needs and more effective deployment of police resources, potentially either delivering more for the same, or the same for less cost.

6.2.4 While Network Rail is the single largest funder of BTP, TOCs are exposed to a significant and uncontrollable cost burden via their PSAs. One alternative funding mechanism could be for all BTP costs to be met via NR, taking TOCs out of the money go round and removing the issues that arise at each refranchising. However, this approach must avoid any obscuring of VfM.

6.3 Amend BTP charging regime to provide fixed and variable elements within the PSA (i)

Potential cost saving £23.6m - £29.5m

6.3.1 Revise the PSA structure to ensure that core activities are funded by a fixed PSA charge and providing users with the ability to agree variable elements.

6.3.2 If successful, this approach would provide potential headline cost savings for core services. It would instil within PSAs the principle of user choice and encourage better engagement of users in determining the appropriate BTP provision to meet their requirements, building on the increasing commercial awareness of BTP.

6.3.3 What would be determined as ‘core services’ requires further detailed assessment. For this option to deliver cost savings to the industry, what is determined as ‘core’ would need to total less than the value of existing PSAs at the time. Failure to do so would inevitably lead to maintenance of the status quo in terms of cost and has the potential to build in additional cost where PSA holders maintain or agree new ‘variable’ enhancements to their PSA.

6.3.4 This approach would require careful planning to prevent significant gaps in the end to end offer and consequent degradation of policing.
7 Option 4: Increasing the Scope of BTP Activities
7 Option 4: Increasing the Scope of BTP Activities

7.1 Add VOSA, TOS, Port and Airport functions to BTP (j)

Potential cost saving approximately £96m across BTP, VOSA and TOS, assume £15-£25million BTP saving

7.1.1 Discussions have taken place with DfT and BTP on the scope for increasing the responsibilities and critical mass of BTP by handing over to BTP responsibility for the VOSA and Traffic Officer roles. BTP has an advanced approach to incident management which is focussed on returning to normal service with minimal disruption. However, in order to spread this aspect of best practice to the Strategic Highway network, there would need to be a transfer of control from Home Office policing to BTP which has not hitherto been considered. There is a major issue in the way that road traffic accidents resulting in fatalities and some that do not are often treated as scenes of crime. This approach results in extremely disruptive closures in order that evidence is not disturbed. BTP has a number of techniques in place on the rail network capable of being applied to the strategic highway network that could have a significant impact on the level of serious disruption, delay and economic cost arising from RTAs and the way that they are currently policed.

7.1.2 Key issues identified by DfT\(^7\) in considering the transfer of responsibility for VOSA and TOS functions to BTP are as follows:

- It could be beneficial to have flexibility of resources to fill perceived service gaps which may arise due to reduced funding for all three organisations; but it is difficult to see how VOSA RET would be able to provide the same flexibility as TOS or BTP given their different operational focus. Therefore if any options were to be considered further it is suggested that these may focus more on BTP and TOS integration.
- It is also difficult to understand the extent that flexibility of resource may fill the perceived service gaps.
- In the absence of clear explanation of how the options may work it is difficult to conclude at this stage that integration of the three organisations could support maintenance or improvement of service levels and at the same time provide cost efficiencies for any of the organisations.
- The opportunity therefore needs to be taken for representatives from the three organisations, specifically BTP, to provide further detail on how integration may or may not work to determine if any of the options should be taken further.

7.1.3 BTP believes that BTP experience and practice in managing incidents is readily transferrable to the Highway network. However, for this to work effectively there would need to be changes in the way road traffic accidents (RTAs) are dealt with. At present, a fatal RTA is often treated as a crime scene or in a risk adverse way causing highway closure and severe disruption for longer than may be necessary. For example, BTP referred to an incident of a hard shoulder fatality caught in entirety on CCTV where a risk adverse approach taken to the management of the site resulted in an eleven hour network closure due to a perceived risk that the coroner may wish to visit the site.

7.1.4 Arguments for increasing BTP responsibilities and diversification need careful consideration. They should not be implemented unless overall savings in overhead costs can be achieved. The previous work undertaken by DfT suggests that there are potential synergies with VOSA and TOS that should be explored further. However a counter view exists that does not see the VOSA and TOS resources as logically belonging in the same force as railway policing since the network geography does not readily map.

\(^7\) DfT (2010) “Transport Management and Policing Integration”
7.1.5 Few views regarding a potential role for BTP in policing Ports and Airports have been gathered as part of this review and the potential for this was not considered in DfT’s report on BTP, TOS and VOSA integration. However one BTPA member stated that BTP policing Heathrow, Gatwick, Manchester and other airports would be sensible but would be resisted by Home Office forces. Further investigation of the implications of this aspect is required.
8 Option 5: Complete Transfer of BTP Responsibilities
8 Option 5: Complete Transfer of BTP Responsibilities

8.1 Complete transfer of BTP responsibilities to Home Office Forces (k)

Potential cost saving approximately £200m, excluding costs of redundancy

8.1.1 Complete transfer of BTP roles and responsibilities to Home Office forces and other agencies is not a course of action that has widespread support within the Rail Industry. Successive Secretaries of State have demonstrated a desire that BTP continue to perform its current role. Rail Industry stakeholders generally appear to have a positive view of BTP but also believe that it is costly and could address that through efficiency savings.

8.1.2 For the purposes of this high level review, it is necessary to consider the extreme option, at one end of a spectrum of strategic options, that of transferring all BTP responsibilities to other agencies.

8.1.3 Mitigation initiatives to deal with the loss of the current BTP presence could include the following:

- Tasking TOCs with security at stations and on trains. This would give them local flexibility to enter into flexible, bespoke contracts with private security firms. It would also remove the administrative burden of BTP form filling requirements;
- Major stations to be patrolled by security firms employed by and directly responsive to NR and SFOs, but with links to the local police force;
- Transferring incident management to specialist units within Home Office forces would remove overhead cost, although it is acknowledged that specialism would be lost.

8.1.4 There is no support for the complete transfer of BTP responsibilities amongst BTPA Members as shown in the illustrative comments recorded below; this possibility elicited strong reactions.

“Abolishing BTP would be counterproductive and is not an option. Boundary disputes would occur; specialist skills and intelligence would be lost and not replaced. There would be a risk of marginalisation and a loss of policing impact as Home Office forces simply would not understand the requirements of the rail industry or prioritise them sufficiently. Overheads would not necessarily reduce if BTP activity and responsibilities were transferred to 43 Home Office forces as there would be 43 HQs handling railway policing as a marginal activity rather than a single national overhead.”

“There is no sensible case for the abolition of BTP. It is considerably better at managing rail incidents than any Home Office force. When the latter arrives at the scene first and asserts authority over the local BTP, the inevitable result is delay and disruption, at a high cost to the rail industry.”

“Incremental efficiency programmes are more likely to deliver results and effective policing than heavy funding cuts. There is scope for efficiencies but no call for a radical curtailment of current roles.”
9 Implementing Change
9 Implementing Change

9.1.1 BTP has undergone many reviews, almost on an annual basis, in addition to the normal audit and HMIC reviews. Each review has a cost in senior staff time, provision of data and time taken to scrutinise and respond to the findings of each review. BTP reports that the morale of the force can be affected by regular reviews. No cost has ever been calculated for the impact on BTP time and resource of each review.

9.1.2 BTP is set up on similar lines to the 43 Home Office forces, with the same standards of evidence and information. The Bichard inquiry defined current standards for exchange of information between forces. Developing a sound intelligence base depends heavily on sharing information across force boundaries. BTP has argued in favour of retaining activities undertaken across all 43 Home Office forces in order to facilitate movement between forces and enable BTP to attract the best police officers.

9.1.3 Centralisation and sharing of some support services with Home Office forces may be feasible but it would be vital to fully understand what would be lost in taking such an approach.

9.1.4 Stakeholder discussions reflected on the core requirements of the VfM review and a keen awareness was demonstrated across the stakeholders and BTP, that funding cuts on a scale not previously considered may well become reality. However, the vast majority of consultees countenanced against the type of radical change that would emanate from a significant budgetary cut.

9.2 Risks Associated with Significant Change

9.2.1 Stakeholders are concerned that transferring BTP responsibilities to Home Office forces could result in degradation of service as Home Office forces would not apply the priority to the Rail industry and its needs that BTP does. Senior TOC and NR staff would not have the access senior police officers that they enjoy from the BTP Command structure. The focus for Home Office forces is changing and the proposal to introduce elected local Police and Crime Commissioners to control individual Chief Constables is likely to reinforce the role of territorial forces in household and community crime. BTPA Members representing the industry value the increasingly commercial facing nature of the BTP.

9.2.2 The current proactivity, commercial and operational knowledge and overall responsiveness may be lost. It has been stated by BTP that, on average, a closure of the railway put in place by the Metropolitan Police will have a duration 2.5 times that of a BTP imposed closure. BTP is considered by several BTPA Members to be considerably better at managing rail incidents than any Home Office force; when the latter arrives at the scene first and asserts authority over the local BTP, the inevitable result is considered to be delay and disruption, at a high cost to the rail industry.

9.2.3 If transfers of responsibility were to be implemented, it would be necessary to put in place strict conditions to safeguard standards of policing. It is unlikely that any Home Office force taking on BTP responsibilities within its area would afford the rail industry the same level of priority as BTP does, by its very nature.

9.2.4 Shrinking back activities leaves gaps and has the risk of knock on effects.

9.2.5 The scale of synergy savings may be limited.

9.2.6 Options to reduce cost include adjusting the mix of PCs, PCSOs and security staff. However, some BTPA members believe that grade dilution could create problems as society shifts in the opposite direction in terms of poor behaviour and respect for authority.
9.2.7 Merging BTP with the Metropolitan Police may not deliver significant benefits. Operationally, BTP acts as the “glue” between modes in London when incidents occur. BTP provides crowd management and manages interfaces between TOCs, NR station staff and LU. Eurostar incidents recently have demonstrated value added by BTP.

9.2.8 Stakeholder discussions identify a prevailing view that incremental efficiency programmes are more likely to deliver results and effective policing than heavy funding cuts. There is scope for efficiencies but a radical curtailment of current roles would be perceived widely to result in degradation of service, increased crime and reduced perceptions of safety and security.

9.2.9 It is reasonable to assume that significant funding cuts may result in adverse consequences. For example, the London Overground concession has seen a significant increase in ridership and revenue as a result of heavy investment in a package of security measures including additional policing. Prior to these initiatives being implemented, crime, vandalism and a perception that it was not safe to travel at night were prevalent. Removing the BTP activity without other security put in place on these services may result in a loss of ridership and reduced revenue.

9.2.10 There is no widely supported case for abolition of BTP. It is generally believed by industry stakeholders to be considerably better at managing rail incidents than any Home Office force. When the latter arrives at the scene first and asserts authority over the local BTP, this often results in delay and disruption, at a high cost to the rail industry.

9.2.11 Overheads would not necessarily reduce if BTP activity and responsibilities were transferred to 43 Home Office forces as there would be 43 HQs handling railway policing as a marginal activity rather than a single national overhead.

9.2.12 The rail industry would achieve cost savings by passing through reductions in costs of BTP services through the PSAs.

9.2.13 Faced with a significant reduction in funding, BTP would be incentivised to undertake a thorough root and branch review of all its activities. BTP would be obliged to refocus on core activities and to implement long term efficiencies.

9.2.14 The transition to a leaner, more motivated force would require cross industry engagement, providing an opportunity for closer cooperation between BTP and its stakeholders to achieve change.