Office of Rail Regulation and Network Rail

**Passenger Information During Disruption**

Review of the Period of Severe Winter Weather from 27th November 2010 to 4th December 2010

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This report takes into account the particular instructions and requirements of our client. It is not intended for and should not be relied upon by any third party and no responsibility is undertaken to any third party.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background to study

The rail industry has, for some time, acknowledged that passenger information during times of disruption is in need of improvement, and whilst there have been a number of initiatives pursued by individual Train Operating Companies (TOCs) in the past, the National Passenger Survey (NPS) consistently rates this feature of Operator performance as poor. ATOC and Network Rail (NR) have, as a consequence, jointly sponsored an industry wide project to devise and implement consistent arrangements for Passenger Information During Disruption (PIDD), and an Approved Code of Practice (ACOP), jointly signed off by ATOC and NR, was issued out in November 2009.

A separate initiative to improve passenger information systems was instigated by the National Task Force (NTF) in August 2010. They requested NR to add a new facility to their Integrated Train Planning System (ITPS), to allow TOCs to submit a timetable to be uploaded one day before it went into operation the next day (on a Day A for Day B basis). Previously the facility within ITPS and its predecessor TSDB was only available with 48 hours’ notice (Day A for Day C). The main driver for this enhancement was to improve the provision of passenger information, in particular for contingency timetables required to be operated at short notice.

NR delivered this enhancement and tested it successfully in-house with a national Bank Holiday timetable. The processing time and requirement to produce a new ‘CIF’ timetable file for signallers via TRUST by 0100 of the day of operation, means that TOCs have to send details of their timetable changes to NR by 1300 the day before (pushed back from the initial deadline of 0900 following successful testing). By the end of November 2010 this facility was ready for use.

As the PIDD project is now coming to a close, and the PIDD Steering Group wound up, NTF has asked for a review of the arrangements which have been implemented in the various TOCs and NR Routes. NR and the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) had mandated the NR Reporter team to conduct this Review in the 4th Quarter of 2010/11. The intention was to produce a final report in May 2011 based on the review of the implementation of PIDD during disruptive events.

However, the advent of the first severe winter weather in late November/ early December 2010, which caused significant operational disruption across the network, was felt to be an important event to review the delivery of PIDD, in advance of the main project, particularly as certain parts of the network – both TOCs and NR - were considered to have performed poorly in respect of their obligations to passenger information.

This report is, therefore, a limited scope synopsis of the key issues gleaned from discussions held with a small sample of TOCs and Routes, pre-agreed with ORR. Meetings with key staff were convened at relatively short notice in the period immediately before and after the Christmas holiday, and at a time when bad weather was still significantly affecting operations, which constrained the availability of managers to attend the meetings. As far as possible, within the
tight timescales for preparing this report, the facts presented to the reporter team have been verified through documentary evidence, but within such a limited sample and limited timescale, corroboration of much of the information has not yet been possible. The forthcoming second phase of the review will allow a more detailed examination of evidence. We would like to record our thanks to staff from all three TOCs and NR Routes surveyed for making themselves available at short notice, and for their openness in discussing lessons learnt and ideas for future improvement.

1.2 Methodology

An initial meeting between the reporter team and the Senior Enhancement Projects Managers of ORR was held on the 9th December to agree the schedule of TOC/NR visits, and agree the briefing/contact arrangements with relevant TOC and NR Directors.

A further meeting was then held on the same day with the joint industry Project Managers for PIDD, from which an understanding of the current status of PIDD within the industry was gleaned, and the proposed visit schedule validated. A meeting was also arranged with ATOC, in order to understand the position of National Rail Enquiries (NRE) and the National Rail Communications Centre (NRCC), as providers of real time and advance information to rail customers. This meeting took place on Monday 13th December at ATOC’s offices.

The agreed schedule of TOC/NR reviews comprised:

- Transpennine Express TOC (TPE);
- East Coast TOC (EC) & NR LNE Route; and
- Southern TOC & NR Sussex Route.

This schedule permitted a review of one Regional, one Long Distance, and one commuter TOC, the latter being a “3rd Rail” Operator particularly badly affected by the snow and ice. The choice of TPE and East Coast allowed the reporter team to explore the synergy or otherwise between two TOCs operating on the East Coast Main Line (ECML), and NR management on behalf of two operators for whom LNE is Lead Route.

Meetings took place as follows:

- TPE on Monday 20th December, in Manchester, with TPE’s Head of Performance and Service Delivery Manager.
- EC & NR LNE on Wednesday 5th January, in York, with EC’s Customer Information & Systems Delivery Manager, NR’s Route Current Operations Manager, and a number of Controllers who worked during the relevant weather event.
- Southern & NR Sussex on Thursday 6th January, in Croydon, with Southern’s Head of Control, NR’s Route Control Manager, Southern’s Area Manager (Metro West), and Passenger Services Manager.
- Opportunity was taken to visit NRCC in Doncaster on 5th January, where the reporter team was received by the NRCC Manager, and given an in depth understanding of the work of the NRCC.
Following publication of a draft of this report, the Reporter team visited NR Train Planning team on the 28th January to better understand the train planning systems and how they feed into the passenger information systems. The findings of this meeting are included in this report.

Before the meetings took place, the reporter team familiarised themselves with the PIDD ACOP and drew up a list of topics for review. This list was then circulated to each meeting host, intending that this should form the substance of the meeting agenda. This covered the principal areas for review and examination, and the requirement for evidence was emphasised in the covering email.

The main findings from the above meetings are described in Section 2 of this report with the emerging conclusions summarised in Section 3. A copy of the ORR Mandate, and the email which related to this specific severe weather event, are attached as Appendices.
2 Findings

2.1 Industry Operational Planning

Whilst operational planning does not form part of the review remit, the extent to which coherent and workable operational plans and timetables are implemented through the industry’s centralised train planning systems in a timely manner contributes to the overall quality and reliability of the information feeding out of a wide range of industry systems to actual and potential passengers. The shortcomings in this area were significant, and are dealt with in more detail in Section 2.3.9.

During 2010, NTF had asked the TOCs to produce contingency timetables consistent with NR’s key route strategies, so that these would be available “off the shelf” for operation and upload under the Day A for Day B facility being developed by NR. This was one of the lessons from the snow in January 2010. They requested that TOCs send these timetables to NR by the end of November 2010, and it was anticipated that the TOCs would send several versions that were tailored for different circumstances.

In the event, by the end of November:

- 6 TOCs had sent contingency timetables to NR;
- 8 TOCs responded by saying that they would not be sending any contingency timetables; and
- 6 TOCs had not responded.

As suggested by the above responses, TOCs have widely divergent views on the wisdom and necessity for pre-planning of train service contingency plans, and NR Routes appear not to insist on a minimum standard of pre-planned contingency timetables, nor take a leadership role in determining how route capacity is utilised in extremis. In the small sample of three TOCs, one had no pre-prepared contingency plans or strategies, one had a complete suite of five plans and a clear view on which to operate in a variety of winter conditions, and the third had a clear plan but it had not been shared with other TOCs operating on the same route.

In the case of EC, they were the only operator on the route to provide a contingency timetable. Their timetable extended ‘public’ timings for trains by 20 minutes approaching destination, and limited the running speed of all trains throughout the route to 80mph. This was incompatible with the timetables of other operators on the route and, as a result, passenger information systems advertised unvalidated timetables with some unrealistic schedules on the ECML for most of the period of contingent working. Similar incompatibility was found on Sussex Route, particularly between Southern and First Capital Connect (FCC) contingency timetables on the Brighton Main Line.

The industry cascade of Extreme Weather Action Team (EWAT) daily planning conferences comprised of a national EWAT at 1000 when the ITPS deadline of 1300 for amending train plans for the following day was emphasised. There then followed a series of local route EWATs which took place in the afternoon after 1300 for the three TOCs reviewed. In all cases the TOCs and Routes made decisions about the following day after their local EWAT in the late afternoon,
several hours after the deadline for uploading files to ITPS had passed, making it difficult to update the various passenger information systems. On the 1st December, however, Southern did move their decision making to the morning and were able to send their train schedule to NR by 1130. Also, during the snow later on in December they introduced ‘Executive EWATs’ at 0930 each morning with decision makers, so that plans for the next day could be agreed early on.

2.2 PIDD Policy & Status

All three TOCs reviewed have comprehensive PIDD Policy documents or standards, either implemented or almost ready to be implemented. EC and Southern have integrated, jointly approved and signed off Policy with the NR Route. All incorporate the guidance contained in the ACOP, to a greater or lesser extent.

Southern have an over-arching document that is held in Control and which includes all the details of the roles and responsibilities that staff undertake. They are in the process of producing two page handouts for briefing their staff. The most succinct and user-friendly of the Policy documents was that prepared by TPE, though it appears that this is not an adopted FirstGroup standard.

All the TOCs and Routes visited still have considerable PIDD training to complete, and all were forecasting an earliest completion date of March 2011 for their nominated staff to attend the centrally-led courses.

Southern started to implement the PIDD ACOP in September 2009 albeit without a complete policy document. Their full implementation was delayed whilst awaiting the industry’s adjudication on common PIDD declaration thresholds, to avoid potentially abortive printing costs for briefing and publicity material. This decision was taken in August 2010, and Southern now anticipate full ‘go live’ in the near future. TPE implemented in September 2010. EC implemented in March 2010, but had in practice been operating to thresholds and guidelines similar to those in the PIDD ACOP since 2009, having implemented the National Express C-COMMS programme which was the forerunner of the national PIDD programme.

In all three cases, the NR Route operations management appeared to be giving full support to the TOCs, at whatever stage in the roll out process they happened to have reached.

The lack of common thresholds and implementation arrangements amongst TOCs sharing a route infrastructure is now perceived by some TOCs to be an unfortunate and unnecessary complication. The Brighton Main Line is cited as a particular example, where Southern and FCC operate very similar, high intensity services and where there would appear to be no logical reason for differing policies on passenger information during disruption.

2.3 PIDD Application

2.3.1 PIDD Implementation During the Severe Weather Event

There was limited application of the formal PIDD requirements at the beginning or during the severe weather in early December. The perception (amongst TOC
operations staff in particular) is that the PIDD protocols, including the Prioritised Planning requirements, are designed for unplanned, unexpected “one off” events. They feel that they do not lend themselves easily to application for events such as the severe weather where contingent operation is often pre-planned, degradation is slow but progressive, affects a wide area of operation, and is characterised by multiple events. That said, it was acknowledged that the principles of PIDD, in providing a structured approach to information provision, are still applicable. These views will be examined further in the second phase of the study.

2.3.2 Customer Service Level 2

Customer Service Level 2 (CSL2) is the PIDD term which describes the threshold at which enhanced arrangements for passenger information provision are triggered. The time it was declared, along with times that recovery estimates and updates were provided, should be recorded by the Control Office.

EC and Southern both admitted that no formal declaration of CSL2 was made during the build up to the disruption, although there is a reference to declared “RED Status” (which triggers CSL2) in the EC Duty Control Manager’s log on the morning of Saturday, 27 November. CSL2 status was also declared on all of EC’s Core messages. There is a single reference to CSL2 in the TPE Duty Manager’s log, for the closure of the South Transpennine route on Wednesday 01 December.

The manner in which CSL2 is declared will be examined further in the next phase of the study, and whether there is best practice for triggering the PIDD actions in a systematic way.

2.3.3 Holding and Core Messages

There was variable application of the Holding and Core Message requirements. There was no evidence that these arrangements were used by TPE. EC issued over 40 Core messages during the weather event which clearly set out the problem, impact and advice to passengers. They also had some excellent enhanced message dissemination arrangements that were sent to station staff. Southern were punctilious in issuing Core Messages to standard for the first three days. However, the general perception of all three TOCs was that rapidly changing situations led to some Core Messages becoming too “high level” to be useful, and the same message issued out every 20 minutes over a long period of time led to some staff no longer checking the message.

2.3.4 Lead Operations Controller & Lead Information Controller

There was variable adherence to the requirement for appointment of a Lead Operations Controller (LOC) by NR, and a Lead Information Controller (LIC) by the TOC. Whilst all TOCs and Routes have designated personnel for these roles, and the reporter team was assured that appointments had been made, there was little, if any, documentary evidence to support these assertions.

Southern put in place a Gold Information line to cover all incidents during the weather event. They felt this to be more effective than appointing a LIC for each incident when there were multiple, separate incidents that culminated in
widespread disruption across the network. EC stated that there was regular contact with NR during the snow event, as evidenced by the high number of Core messages issued, and that their level of dialogue has increased since the implementation of PIDD arrangements.

On a multi-TOC route such as LNE, where every Operator is severely disrupted and so implementing the PIDD arrangements, it is the view of the Route that it is almost impossible to satisfactorily assign the LOC role, such that it can be effectively discharged. This lack of a focus point was felt particularly acutely by TPE, whose Control Office (co-located with NR LNW Control in Manchester) is remote from its Lead Route, LNE in York. Not surprisingly, even routine communication during the severe weather was described as poor, let alone the enhanced level of communication specified in the PIDD protocol.

In the next phase of the study, we will investigate the best approaches to LIC and LOC appointments during network wide disruption.

There was good evidence that TOCs and the Routes had invoked the appropriate escalation processes which alerted, and mobilised, senior management through the ‘on call’ and Duty Officer arrangements.

### 2.3.5 Ticket Acceptance & Do Not Travel

All three TOCs appear to have clear policies, included within their documented PIDD processes, for re-routing passengers (and securing the consent of affected TOCs to do so), for amending ticket validities, for mobilising alternative travel on LUL and London bus services, for engaging emergency road transport, and for issuing “Do Not Travel” advice.

A key weakness, however, is the limited visibility which ticket selling staff have of the status of the operational railway, especially away from immediate line of route. Whilst it is the case that most ticket retailing staff do have access to the information systems which can provide real time information, either through Tyrell messaging or NRE Live Departures, in practice they may not ordinarily have time, opportunity, or incentive to check that the journey for which they are about to sell a ticket, can be completed. The PIDD ACOP is largely silent on this issue, but situations have been cited by Passenger Focus where this particular disconnect is highlighted.

### 2.3.6 On train staff

The effectiveness of information provided to on train staff is largely determined by the mode of receipt in use by the relevant member of on train staff, and his/ her diligence in tracking and using the information. Guards or Conductors using Blackberry devices have information access as good as that available to passengers, improved further if the TOC messaging service from Customer Information Control is timely. There are, however, some issues to consider:

- TOCs using text messaging to traditional pagers or mobile phones do not have the same flexibility, and have constraints in the capacity of the medium. TPE currently use text messaging, but are seeking investment approval to issue all Conductors with Blackberries.
All of the TOCs reported that on train staff became overwhelmed by the high number of messages they received during this event. They receive all messages, and one idea suggested was to try to find a way to target the relevant messages, perhaps by adding filters to the messaging software.

Driver Only Operated (DOO) services present a particular challenge, as the Driver is the ‘front line’ of passenger information but is not permitted to have a switched on mobile or Blackberry in the cab because of the risk of distraction. The Driver is therefore wholly reliant on messages from signallers over the Cab Secure Radio or in General Messages broadcast from the Signalling Centre. Southern are particularly exercised by this issue, as the majority of Metro services are Driver Only Operated.

The information conveyed by automated PA announcements and internal PIS displays requires the Guard/Conductor to enter the correct PIS/PA code into the automated system to recognise the non-standard working of the train during the severe weather. This is a vulnerability which all Operators with modern, automated PA/PIS face; the correct programming code for normal working usually appears on the Guard/Conductor or Drivers docket – the staff normally have to use some initiative to find the non-standard codes. And, as was admitted by Southern, some routes and calling patterns are not available in the auto facility, due to limitations on processor memory, leaving staff with no option but to default to “Listen for PA announcements” on the PIS screen. That said, Southern have a franchise agreement to upgrade the PIS system in some of their units to permit more codes.

2.3.7 Hub Stations

The PIDD protocol encourages the adoption of hub and satellite stations to bring about improved quality and timeliness of information to the smaller, less well-staffed stations. In concept, the hub station receives a full service of information through the various media, and keeps its satellite stations updated with relevant information, obviating the need for calls to Control. The hub will also support the satellite with staff and other facilities if the need arises.

All three TOCs stated that they used the hub station concept, although there was little in the way of documentary evidence to support these assertions. In practice, the PIDD requirements appear to have cemented the existing relations which already exist between smaller stations and adjacent ‘parent’ stations. They report that fewer phone calls have been received by Control directly from stations.

2.3.8 Station Customer Information Systems (CIS)

The fact that there are between 60 and 70 different CIS systems in use in the UK industry is an indication of the scale of the problem that exists at stations in the provision of accurate and timely customer information. These systems have various configurations of information feed, updating, and display, and are as a result an area of considerable weakness.

Many of the UK’s largest and busiest stations have stand-alone CIS systems which are manually amended and updated, and are largely dependent on a member of staff having the necessary information, and then keeping up with the necessary changes and updates in a timely manner. This is the case at many of NR’s Managed Stations. Manual updating tends to be weakest where relatively
minor deviations to plan apply – delays up to 5 minutes, short notice platform changes, variations to stock formation.

Auto updating of train running in CIS can also take a number of forms. Updates may be drawn directly from the Train Describer, from TRUST, or, in the case of most modern systems, the NRE databases which feed the industry’s real time information systems, such as NRE’s Darwin platform. Southern’s modern, centrally managed CIS even feeds ‘the other way’, with CIS updating Darwin. Generally speaking, auto updating is more reliable than manual updating, but is vulnerable to error when, for instance, performance allowances in the timetable are not reflected in the CIS programmes – a complaint of TPE at Manchester Piccadilly – or where a train is at a stand, and the CIS ticks up a further minute’s delay with every minute that passes.

During the severe weather event in early December, the key reason for CIS systems displaying inaccurate – sometimes wildly inaccurate - information was the failure to load the planned contingency timetable to ITPS. The issues surrounding ITPS are covered in more detail below in Section 2.3.9.

The other significant determinant of CIS accuracy is that all TOCs must exercise the same input discipline, and the same rigorous check of the timetable download to ensure that CIS is accurate at stations for which they are not the Station Facility Operator (SFO), especially on multi-TOC routes. The SFO only has visibility of the train plan for its own TOC, unless the other TOC(s) make their service available to all parties, or ask specifically for help in uploading amendments to SFO information systems.

2.3.9 IT Systems Issues

The industry systems architecture for disseminating train service and train running information to both staff and customers is both complex, and in a constant state of change. It was clear to the reporter team that even those closely associated with information provision at TOC and Route level had only a rudimentary understanding of how the systems work, and particularly how the interfaces between different systems interact with each other.

This event was the first time that TOCs and NR had used the new Day A for Day B facility for uploading contingency timetables in ITPS. Mistakes were made and many of the examples of poor (or simply wrong) information seen by passengers – on TOC websites, from NRE, and on station CIS displays – took staff by surprise and became an unexpected first time learning experience. One month on from the event, the staff interviewed by the reporter team were much more knowledgeable about these systems issues, and how to reduce the risk of making the same mistakes in the future.

It should be noted that NR received requests from TOCs to manually update thousands of trains each day in ITPS. The fact that few TOCs have pre-prepared contingency plans for weather events such as this means that the NR Train Planning office is having to input from scratch - a time consuming process, and one which exacerbates the risk of inadvertent input error.

Having a pre-planned contingency timetable does not necessarily mean it can always be used ‘as is’. The available infrastructure on the route can be in a state of flux, especially with changing weather conditions. NR therefore expects to
have discussions with the TOC about precise details of the timetable to be operated. However, they recommend that each TOC should have a full suite of contingency timetables that reflect the key route strategies and which can form the base of the timetable to be operated.

Neither ITPS in its present form, nor its TSDB predecessor, is able to offer an accurate picture of the following day’s contingent timetable at the time most customers will be wanting to see it – in the evening of the day before. This is a particular concern, highlighted by Passenger Focus and a hostile media, and has been portrayed as a sign of industry indifference or incompetence. Whilst NR is currently investigating whether the processing time can be speeded up, in the meantime the solution by TOCs is to issue messages on their web-sites describing the timetable that will be in place the next morning.
3 Interim Conclusions

These conclusions have been drawn from limited research with a small sample of TOCs and Routes, and should be regarded as interim pending validation and corroboration during the wider second phase of the study.

- The quality of operational planning by TOCs and the leadership from NR Routes in this area was a key determinant of the quality and reliability of information feeding through a wide range of industry systems to passengers. The failure to align daily pre-planning timescales during the severe weather event (at least at the start) with those of the industry train planning system (ITPS) meant that key decisions about next day timetables were being taken long after the deadlines for uploading to ITPS.

- All three TOCs have implemented PIDD policy: East Coast implemented in March 2010 and have already reviewed and updated their application policy following lessons learnt from past incidents; TPE implemented in September 2010; and Southern implemented in September 2009.

- PIDD policy documentation in the TOCs is complete or almost complete. All the documents seen cover the key requirements of the ACOP, and some are jointly sponsored and signed off with the NR Route.

- All TOCs and Routes have considerable training still to complete.

- PIDD application during the severe weather was limited, largely because of a perception amongst TOC Managers that PIDD was not intended for, and does not comfortably fit with, the severe weather situation experienced in early December. Accordingly, the use of key processes (declaration of CSL2 status, use of Holding and Core Messages, and appointment of Lead Operations and Lead Information Controllers) was variable. However, the view was expressed that the underlying PIDD principles of a structured approach to the provision of information was applied and found to be beneficial.

- The effectiveness of information provided to on train staff is largely determined by the mode of receipt in use by the relevant member of on train staff. Guards or Conductors using Blackberry devices have information access as good as that available to passengers, improved further if the TOC messaging service from Customer Information Control is timely. EC and Southern Guards/ Conductors use Blackberries, TPE are seeking authority to upgrade from paging devices. One issue raised is the large volume of messages sent to on train staff, and consideration might be given to better targeting of the messages.

- There are particular weaknesses on Driver Only Operated (DOO) services – delivering timely information to the driver - and in the programming of automated PA/PIS on modern stock.

- Station Customer Information Systems (CIS), of which there are some 60 –70 different variants across the industry, are an area of weakness due to the variety of modes of information feeding and updating. Automated systems are reliant on accurate information being provided by ITPS, otherwise they have to be corrected manually the following morning.

- The severe weather was the first significant exposure front line Managers had to the workings of ITPS in the application of revised, contingent services and
timetables. This is a new and improved facility available to the industry for providing passenger information about the next day’s timetable. However, some mistakes were made in uploading the timetables, not helped by the thousands of train schedules that needed updating. The unfamiliarity with the systems also meant it took some time to identify and solve some problems. The event was therefore a learning exercise for the industry.

- There is a risk that retail staff are not consistently checking Tyrell messages to ensure they are selling tickets for trains that are operating. In addition, Fast Ticket machines continue selling all tickets in all circumstances.
Appendix A

ORR Mandate
7 December 2010

Dear Graham

ORR Reporter Mandate 10
Addendum to proposal

This letter is an addendum to our proposal to review the provision of passenger information during delays and disruption (PIDD). That proposal covered carrying out reviews of eight case studies from January to March 2011 by use of questionnaires and interviews. You have requested an additional review to cover the disruption to train services experienced last week during the bad weather. This additional work is covered by this letter.

Following discussions with Nick Layt, Tim Leighton and Kim Gorman, we propose to review the following three TOCs and routes:

- Southern (Sussex route) – as an example of a London commuter operator,
- East Coast – as an example of a long distance intercity operator, and
- Transpennine Express (Eastern route) – as an example of a regional operator.

These three have been chosen because they all suffered from severe disruption last week and so the provision of good information will have been important to passengers. They have all adopted PIDD over the last year, so we will be able to test how well they applied the principles in practice and identify any lessons to learn. The advantage of covering both East Coast and Transpennine Express is that we can review how well they interacted with each other on their shared route.
These three case studies will be added to the eight we have proposed for January to March 2011, and will be included in the final report. As for all the case studies, the focus of the review will be on the provision of passenger information rather than the train operations.

Because we will want to meet the TOCs as soon as possible, we will not have time to prepare and send out a questionnaire to attendees. We therefore propose the following method:

- Approach the PIDD champion for each TOC to agree and set up the review meetings and confirm who to see. We will ask them to send relevant background information (PIDD reviews, control logs, customer complaints etc). We will want to focus the review on a particular route/incident/date so will need to agree this with them (perhaps after reviewing relevant information).
- Contact NRES for information on the routes and details of when CSL2 was triggered on the routes; also set up an early meeting with them to cover all three case studies.
- Meet each of the TOC/NR routes to go through the incident with an agenda sent out in advance. This is likely to involve several separate meetings with staff from control and ‘those on the ground’ such as station managers.

We would ask the ORR to inform the National Task Force of this review at the upcoming meeting, as well as specifically the Managing Directors of the three affected TOCs.

Our aim will be to carry out all interviews before Christmas. We will produce a short note on our findings from each incident which we will send to the TOC and Network Rail route for comment before Christmas. We will then issue the notes formally to you after Christmas.
Appendix B

Covering Email from ORR
Dear all

> As you will be aware the ORR has asked one of our reporters (Arup) to
> look at the application of the PIDD process across the network. This
> work will review a number of incidents and was originally planned to
> start in the new year. However, we would like Arup to include the
> recent severe weather disruption as well. The objective remains the
> same, i.e. to understand how well initiatives to embed the ATOC code
> of practice has worked in practice by reviewing specific cases.
> After discussing this with the PIDD project managers and ourselves the
> reporter would like to review incidents in your area of operations
> (Southern, East Coast and First Transpennine Express), chosen because
> you suffered from severe disruption last week and provide examples
> from London/south east, regional and inter city operations. PIDD has
> been adopted in your areas over the last year and so the reporter will
> be able to test how well the initiative worked in major disruptive
> circumstances. The focus of the review will be on the provision of
> passenger information rather than the train operations.
> The reporter will first contact the PIDD champion in each of your TOCs
> to confirm who best to discuss this with. The Reporter will also
> contact NRES for information on the routes and selected dates. It is
> hoped that interviews will happen over the course of the next week and
> draft findings will be available for your comments before Christmas.

I am emailing you out of courtesy to let you know what is happening.

Regards

Graham Richards

Head of Planning & Operations

Office of Rail Regulation