

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



27 February 2024

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

RAIB Report: Dangerous occurrence at Lindridge Farm user worked crossing, near Bagworth, Leicestershire on 22 March 2012

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 3 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 29 July 2013.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 3 is **'Closed'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 3

The intent of this recommendation is to mandate that the position of fixed infrastructure on any new signaller display is correlated to its position on the existing signaller display. By doing this any discrepancies can be identified and the reasons for them understood.

Network Rail should revise its design processes so as to specifically require that the position of fixed infrastructure, shown on any new signaller's display being installed by a project, is correlated to its position as shown on the existing signaller's display that is being replaced. This work should be carried out by staff who are qualified as competent to do correlation, and when a discrepancy is found between the new and existing signaller displays, they should record it and investigate the reason for it. Such an investigation should include a check of the accuracy of associated records, such as signalling or scheme plans, and result in the necessary corrections being made to the design or to the records to resolve the discrepancy.

ORR decision

1. The key causal factor of the near miss at Lindridge Farm level crossing was the position of the crossing was incorrect relative to the track circuits. During consultation on the draft report, ORR observed that this recommendation did not align with the causal factors identified in the investigation and suggested alternatives. Network Rail also state that the recommendation does not align with the causal factor and has the potential to introduce additional risk.

2. In terms of action taken to prevent a similar incident happening again, we recognise the work Network Rail has put into updating the signalling design handbook (NR/L2/SIG/11201) and the processes in place that would make this type of error considerably less likely. The hierarchy in NR/L2/SIG/11201 reduces the risk of this happening again. In addition, the competence framework and improvements in non-technical skills will contribute to a reduction in the likelihood of an error of this type happening again (section 6 of the handbook). Design software has also changed, preventing multiple references to the same track.

3. Recommendation 5 from the Lindridge Farm report was concerned with reducing the risk of a level crossing being shown in the incorrect place on a signaller's display when telephones are fitted to it. In response to the recommendation, and in order to improve understanding of existing procedures, Network Rail briefed operational staff that changes to signaller's displays shall only be undertaken by an authorised and competent person in accordance with signal engineering standards and requirements (e.g. NR/L2/SIG/11201) and uncontrolled changes to signaller's displays are not permitted and any deficiencies should be identified and reported to the Route Asset Manager (Signal).

4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

5. On 9 June 2014 ORR reported the following:

ORR discussed this recommendation in detail and actions being taken in relation to other recommendations at a meeting with Network Rail on 9 December 2013 and agrees that non-implementation of this recommendation may be valid when we receive confirmation of actions taken in relation to recommendation 5 in this report.

Update

6. On 26 October 2023 ORR wrote to Network Rail and asked the following:

We would like to provide RAIB with an update on action taken to address recommendation 3 from the RAIB report Dangerous occurrence at Lindridge Farm user worked crossing, near Bagworth, Leicestershire 22 March 2012.

The recommendation states:

The intent of this recommendation is to mandate that the position of fixed infrastructure on any new signaller display is correlated to its position on the existing signaller display. By doing this any discrepancies can be identified and the reasons for them understood.

Network Rail should revise its design processes so as to specifically require that the position of fixed infrastructure, shown on any new signaller's display being installed by a project, is correlated to its position as shown on the existing signaller's display that is being replaced. This work should be carried out by staff who are qualified as competent to do correlation, and when a discrepancy is found between the new and existing signaller displays, they should record it and investigate the reason for it. Such an investigation should include a check of the accuracy of associated records, such as signalling or scheme plans, and result in the necessary corrections being made to the design or to the records to resolve the discrepancy.

We have previously received correspondence from Network Rail indicating that closure of recommendation 3 was covered by actions taken to address recommendation 5, which we reported as implemented on 15 December 2015 . We received an email on 22 July 2016 setting out how recommendation had been addressed (see attached), but we do not think it clearly demonstrates how the action taken to address recommendation 5 also addresses recommendation 3. Could you therefore write to us again explaining this point. It would also be helpful if you could explain how any other developments in the intervening 7 years have contributed to a reduction in the risk of the position of fixed infrastructure on a new signaller display being correlated to its position on the existing signaller display.

We would be happy to meet you to discuss.

7. On 18 November 2023 Network Rail responded as follows:

The ongoing discussion is RAIB asking why NR has not updated the design processes in 11201, ORR passing on the message, which NR has replied “because the processes are correct and the causal factor at Lindridge farm was human error because the designers did not follow the process set out”, which is the basis of the original closure statement, ORR passing on the message.

All the discussion seems to centre around RAIB not accepting that the original recommendation was too prescriptive, and NR refusing to change a design process (as it considers that will make it less safe).

In short NR consider that actioning rec 3 as written would increase the likelihood of another Lindridge Farm incident, rather than reduce it. The reasons have been previously stated in the closure statements.

In hindsight looking at this now, we should have rejected the rec.

Previously reported to RAIB

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Actions taken or being taken to address the recommendation

1. On 1 November 2013 Network Rail provided the following information:

Network Rail do not consider correlation of fixed infrastructure to signallers display to be required as the additional controls outlined in our response to Recommendation 5 will manage the risk.

ORR decision

2. ORR discussed this recommendation in detail and actions being taken in relation to other recommendations at a meeting with Network Rail on 9 December 2013 and agrees that non-implementation of this recommendation may be valid when we receive confirmation of actions taken in relation to recommendation 5 in this report.

Status: In progress. We expect to update RAIB by 30 September 2014